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Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in 
China 
Kingsley Edney 
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Abstract: Studies of Chinese soft power have emphasized its potential to ameliorate the security 
ĚŝůĞŵŵĂĂŶĚŚĞůƉŚŝŶĂĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌŝƐĞ ? ?tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƵƐĞĨƵů ?ŝƚŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬƐĂŶ
important alternative Chinese interpretation of soft power as a response to domestic security challenges. 
In order to address this omission this article uses a regime security approach to examine soft power in 
the Chinese context. Through an investigation of the Chinese concept of 'cultural security' the article 
reveals that Chinese analysts view soft power as having the potential to help the Chinese Communist 
Party solve an internal security predicament by enhancing regime legitimacy and national cohesion. 
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^ŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĨĨĞĐƚŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽ-optive means of framing the agenda, 
ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? ?EǇĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ?
20-21), is a popular concept in China. The term ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚďǇŚŝŶĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐĂŶĚŝƐŶŽǁƉĂƌƚŽĨ
the official lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŝŶǀŽůǀĞ
ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ ‘ŵĞŐa-ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ
international media presence, pursuing foreign policies designed to improve its image as a responsible 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐŚŝŶĞƐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂƚƚŝŵĞƐ ?ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ 
economic success has attracted internationally (see Zhang, 2012, pp. 623-626). Chinese officials appear 
to be most comfortable discussing soft power strategy in the context of culture, however, and often 
ĞŵƉůŽǇƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?dŚĞ WĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛrecent cultural reform policies, which it claims are 
necessary to achieve what Chinese President yŝ:ŝŶƉŝŶŐŚĂƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŶĂDƌĞĂŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚ
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, are in part motivated by the desire to increase soft power (see CCP 
Central Committee, 2011). /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?yŝ:ŝŶƉŝŶŐ ?ƐŚŝŶĂƌĞĂŵĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝƐŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
quest for soft power (see Callahan, 2015). 
At the same time, the topic of soft power has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars studying 
ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛinternational relations. Some researchers have attempted broad assessments of the strengths 
and weaknesses of China ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŚŽĂŶĚ:eong, 2008; Ding, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2006; Huang 
and Ding, 2006). Others have examined the intellectual history of the concept in China and explain how 
it has been reinterpreted (Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Li, 2009) or its relationship with other Chinese 
ideas about foreign relations, such as public diplomacy (Wang, 2008) or foreign propaganda (Edney, 
2012). Some have examined case studies of Chinese soft power policy areas or initiatives (Ding and 
Saunders, 2006; Paradise, 2009) ŽƌƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ bilateral or regional relations (Shen 
and Taylor, 2012; Hall and Smith, 2013).  
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Amid this proliferation of research into Chinese soft power a common consensus has emerged that the 
ŵĂũŽƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐƚŽĂŵĞůŝŽƌĂƚĞƚŚĞsecurity dilemma generated by 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌ ?^ŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŝƐĂŵĞĂŶƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚŚŝŶĂĐĂŶĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨĞĂƌ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ ?
that might trigger containment or balancing behavior. This approach is useful because it highlights an 
important reason why the concept of soft power has been embraced by the Chinese leadership even 
more than in its intellectual home of the United States. By focusing on foreign policy and emphasizing 
the security dilemma, however, this national security approach overlooks the relationship between soft 
ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞW ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ. Although previous studies have noted that in China soft power has 
a relevance to domestic politics that is not ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶEǇĞ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ of the concept (Barr, 
2012, p. 82; Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 20; Li, 2009, p. 28) and scholars have pointed out serious 
ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƐƵĐh as governance problems, 
ŝŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĞŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 73; Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 430), the 
relationship between regime security and soft power in China is yet to be explored. This article aims to 
address this omission and in doing so contribute toward building a more complete view of the sources 
of insecurity shaping China ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ soft power than is provided by a sole focus on national 
security and the security dilemma. 
The article begins by defining regime security and explaining the conceptual relationship between soft 
power and regime security, with particular reference to legitimacy and national cohesion in China. It 
then examines the discourse ŽĨ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?wenhua anquan) in China to demonstrate that 
Chinese analysts are indeed applying the concept of soft power not only to national security but also to 
regime security concerns. In particular, the way that soft power has been applied to the realm of 
cultural security in China problematizĞƐEǇĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĚŚŝŶĞƐĞƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĐĂŶďĞ
mutually reinforcing (Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22). The conclusion 
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emphasizes the importance of taking regime security into account when investigating soft power 
beyond the liberal democratic West.  
 
National security, regime security, and soft power 
 
The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of 
China ?ƐŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞǆŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ and the most widely cited reason for China wanting 
to increase its soft power ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ>ŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?ƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌŝƐ ‘ƉƌŝŵĂ ŝůǇ ƵƚŝůŝǌĞĚƚŽƌĞĨƵƚĞƚŚĞ
 “ŚŝŶĂƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĂďĞƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƐŽĐŝŽ-economic reality, and 
persuade ƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞ ? ?ĞŶŐ ? ? ? ? ?, p. 64) argues that in China 
the concept of soft power  ‘ƚŽĂůĂƌŐĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶ ǁŽƌůĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐǁŝƚŚ
the goal of achieving great power status without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of 
ŚŽƐƚŝůĞďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐŽƌǁĂƌ ? ?/ŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐĞ ?ŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ĂƌŐƵĞƐ
ƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉƐ ‘ƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐand 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĂĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ZĂǁŶƐůĞǇ ? ? ? ?  Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂ ‘ŚŝŶĂƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ŶŽƚŽŶůǇƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ?EǇĞĂůƐŽĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚ
ƉŽǁĞƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ‘ƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚƐŚĂƌĚƉŽǁĞƌůŽŽŬůĞƐƐƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŽŝƚƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƐŽĨƚ
power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China 
(Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013). This kind of national security perspective on Chinese soft power helps explain 
why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the 
possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China¶s soft power project.  
ZĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐĞůŝƚĞƐĂƌĞƐĞĐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵǀŝŽůĞŶƚ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƌƵůĞ ? ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝme is 
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ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐďƵƚĂůƐŽŽĨ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? (heping 
yanbian) ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚŚĞW ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽůŽƌ
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŽĐĐurred in some post-Soviet states (see Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 88-89). The 
 ‘ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐŵĂůůƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽŚŽůĚƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŽĨĨŝĐĞƐ Q and/or are the elite 
that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?:Žď ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?
While this article uses the term regime security rather than state security, it should be noted that there 
is often no clear dividing line between state and regime security withŝŶĂ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ-ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚƉŽůŝƚǇ ? ?'ŝůůĞǇ ?
2006, p. 501) such as China, where there is significant penetration of the state by the Party. Despite 
China ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚmany of the common sources of insecurity for developing states, such 
as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15), two 
important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and 
lack of national cohesion.  
For a political authority such as the CCP, legitimacy is determined by the degree to whŝĐŚŝƚ ‘ŚŽůĚƐĂŶĚ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌǁŝƚŚůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ?ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĂůůŽĨŝƚƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
(Gilley, 2009, p. 11). In other words, the use of power must proceed according to rules, these rules are 
justified by widely shared beliefs, and the actions of those in subordinate positions provide evidence 
that they consent to the power relationship (Beetham, 1991, p. 16). There has been a great deal of elite 
discussion of Party legitimacy in China, particularly since the early 2000s; one study showed that 68% of 
ƐĂŵƉůĞĚŚŝŶĞƐĞũŽƵƌŶĂůĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐĂďŽƵƚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇƚŽŽŬƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞW ?ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌ
threat, while 30% claimed the Party faced a legitimacy crisis (Gilley and Holbig, 2009, p. 343), and a 
more recent study found that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about regime legitimacy in 
China than their Western counterparts (Zeng, 2014). For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to 
resolve the question of whether or not the CCP currently faces a legitimacy crisis, however, only to show 
that the potential for the party-state to lose its legitimacy is a serious source of insecurity. 
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The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 2014, provides clear evidence that 
senior Party officials are highly concerned about the legality ŽĨWƉŽǁĞƌ ?dŚĞWůĞŶƵŵ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌĨŽĐƵƐ
ǁĂƐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇƚŽ ‘ƌƵůĞĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞůĂǁ ? yi fa zhi guo )ĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŐŽŽĚůĂǁŝƐ
ĂƉƌĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞĨŽƌŐŽŽĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇƚŽƌƵůe according to the law it must first rule 
according to the constitution (Xinhua, 2014). Responsibility for the justification of Party power falls on 
the Central Propaganda Department, which utilizes a comprehensive network of institutions to attempt 
to reproduce the official discourse justifying CCP rule and suppress any rival discourses that might 
challenge it (see Edney, 2014). Lack of consent is also a problem that requires significant resources to 
overcome. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in recent years the annual number of 
major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 (Huang, 2012). While all states use domestic force to 
ƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĞƵǌĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝ Ɛ ? ƵŐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
apparatus, ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐŚĂƐĞǆĐĞĞĚĞĚĞǀĞŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?DĂƌƚŝŶĂ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
demonstrates that the lack of consent to CCP rule is widespread enough to be a cause for serious 
concern.  
Soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction 
that is associated with a rise in soft power makes it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the 
truth of its claim ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐŝƐŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌŝƚƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ, where status is 
defined not only in terms of material capabilities but also in terms of social recognition. For the most 
part, evidence of an increase in international recognition and attraction could be used to bolster claims 
that the regime has ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ, regardless of whether soft 
power is a result of attraction to political values, culture, or foreign policies, or whether it is generated 
by the policies of the regime or sources within broader society. Some internationally attractive cultural 
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products can also be the work of dissidents or relate to aspects of culture or values that the regime 
would rather suppress, however, and these sources of attraction are difficult for the authorities to 
exploit.  
Chinese political elites feel a keen sense of obligation to restore the counƚƌǇ ?ƐƉĂƐƚ great-power status 
(Deng, 2008, pp. 8-9) and show its people that China is globally respected and admired (Zhang, 2012, p. 
620). dŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƐĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐďǇŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ĨĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌŚŝŶĂ
abroad (Gries, 2004, pp. 120-121) and the party-state has often publicized statements of support or 
ĂĚŵŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂůůŝĞƐƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇďŽůƐƚĞƌŝƚƐŵŽƌĂů
claim to rule (e.g. Brady, 2003, p. 228). If there is a broad-based growth in Chinese soft power, these 
statements are likely to become more common and more credible as the number and variety of foreign 
actors who are attracted to China increases. Moreover, international attraction ƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ
areas such as economic dĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĞǆƉĂŶĚƐƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ŶŽĚĞƐ ?ŝŶnetworks ŽĨ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇďĞůŝĞĨ ?,
thereby reducing the marginal cost of persuasion and squeezing out alternative discourses that might 
challenge regime legitimacy (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 26-27). This makes it easier for the CCP to claim 
legitimacy based on its success in moving China ƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚŐŽĂůŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƌĞũƵǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
Although national cohesion is a concept that is rather nebulous and difficult to assess, the regular 
references to cohesion in official CCP statements indicate that Chinese leaders are worried about 
cohesion and seek to improve it (e.g. CCP Central Committee 2011, 2013). As China has become a more 
plural society, generating social consensus (ningju gongshi) and unifying the people (ningju renxin) have 
become serious concerns for the propaganda authorities (Edney, 2014). According to propaganda chief 
>ŝƵzƵŶƐŚĂŶ ?ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝŶĂĚƌĞĂŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƌĞũƵǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ
cultural cohesion (Xinhua, 2013), while an early article on national cultural security published on a CCP 
website argues that if a country lacks cohesion ? even if it is strong in terms of other forms of 
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power ? when it faces challenges such as a natural disaster or foreign invasion it will  ‘ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
ďůŽǁ ? ?bu kan yi ji) (Yang, 2006). A lack of national cohesion can be a persistent problem for weak states 
that are unable to generate  ‘ĂĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŽĨƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƚŽĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ
the large-scale use ŽĨĨŽƌĐĞĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůŝĨĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Buzan, 1983, p. 67).  
Normally soft power refers to ĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƚŽĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? To consider the 
possibility that soft power could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the 
concept of soft power to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense the soft power 
of the political, social, and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and 
individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the 
authorities at the center. Although this might seem to be a major step away from the traditional 
interpretation of soft power, EǇĞ ?Ɛ(2011, p. 19-20) argument that soft power is a key requirement of an 
effective counter-insurgency strategy and that dealing with the threat of terrorism requires the soft 
power of an appealing narrative that can win over mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting 
new members to their groups highlights ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?Ɛpotential significance for state efforts to respond 
to domestic sources of instability. In this case soft power involves enhancing regime security by making 
it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain 
material support from the local population, which then makes it easier for the state to deal with the 
security threat they pose. 
The authorities in Beijing face a range of threats to national cohesion from peripheral regions, including 
the ongoing problem of terrorism and insurgent attacks in Xinjiang, protests and discontent in Tibet, 
pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and de facto independence in Taiwan. In light of these challenges 
it would not be unreasonable for scholars or even the authorities to interpret the concept of soft power 
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as something that could also be applied to improve regime security by enhancing the cohesion between 
the political, social, and cultural core of the Chinese polity and those on the margins. Indeed, in more 
general terms, Wang and Lu (2008, p. 427) have pointed out that Chinese interpretations of soft power 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞŝŶĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇďǇŵŽƌĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞĂŶĚƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ? ? 
Soft power is also ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌŽĨother actors can 
constitute a threat to cohesion or CCP legitimacy. dĂŝǁĂŶ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂĐĐŽrding to most Taiwanese, 
stems primarily from its democratic system and values (Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 432). The appeal of 
dĂŝǁĂŶ ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ has increased international support for the Taiwanese authorities (Hughes, 1999, 
pp. 134-136), particularly in the United States, and thus undermines party-state efforts to push for 
reunification. The liberal democratic values that are a key feature of American soft power are also a 
source of regime insecurity in China and will be discussed further in the section on soft power and 
cultural security below. Non-state actors can also possess soft power (Nye, 2004, pp. 90-97) and in 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐĂƐĞƚŚĞƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĂůĂŝ>ĂŵĂĂŶĚTibetan exile community can have a negative effect 
on party-state efforts to generate national cohesion. Dealing with these challenges is not as simple as 
improving Chinese soft power, since an increase in the attractiveness of one actor does not necessarily 
result in another becoming less attractive. When the values the CCP appeals to in order to justify its rule 
are incompatible with the values associated with the soft power of other actors, however, Chinese 
attempts to build soft power become more competitive and defensive. Li (2009, p. 33) points out that 
many Chinese analysts and other elites ďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝ ŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ
can reduce the influence of Western culture and defend against the infiltration of liberal political ideas, 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂŵŽŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐǇŽƵƚŚ ?  
 
Cultural security in China 
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The rise in awareness of and appreciation for the concept of soft power has occurred during a period 
when the CCP is acutely aware of what it sees as the growing urgency of global cultural and ideological 
competition. Party documents regularly claim that the status and function of culture in the international 
competition for  ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŝƐďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐůĞĂƌ (e.g. CCP Central 
Committee and PRC State Council, 2012; 2005). From a national security perspective soft power is 
attractive ƚŽƚŚĞWďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĚŝůĞŵŵĂďǇĂůůŽǁŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
power to increase without a corresponding increase in the fear of others toward China. From a regime 
security perspective, however, soft power offers a potential solution to a different dilemma ? how to 
gain the benefits of being open to international cultural influence and exchange without undermining 
domestic national cohesion or becoming vulnerable to ideological threats. In other words, soft power 
has a potential ƌŽůĞƚŽƉůĂǇŝŶĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
The concept of cultural security is not new to China, but it came into greater focus around the time of 
the Sixth Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee in late 2011, when it was mentioned regularly 
in official and semi-official statements. Although there is no authoritative definition of cultural security 
in China, by examining official statements such as the 12th Five Year Plan, the semi-official articles about 
cultural security that have been published on the websites of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂŝůǇ, as well as the interpretations of Chinese scholars that appear in academic journals in 
China, it is possible to obtain a clearer idea of what cultural security means in the Chinese political 
context. The way these sources use the concept of cultural security demonstrates that it is an important 
aspect of security that involves shielding Chinese culture and values from foreign threats as well as 
enhancing the ability of Chinese culture and values to compete for international influence by 
maintaining their relevance and dynamism.  
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The policymaking process in China is largely opaque and it is not generally possible to discern the 
relationship between academic discussions of a topic and official policy. It is not uncommon, however, 
for top leaders to raise the importance of a particular concept without specifying its exact meaning and 
for the scholarly community to then attempt to define or analyze the concept in greater depth. This 
appears to be what has happened in the case of cultural security. During 2011-12, the period leading up 
to and just after the Sixth Plenum, 37 academic journal articles with cultural security (wenhua anquan) 
in their title appeared in the politics, military affairs, and law section of the CNKI database, which was 
more than the total number of similar articles for the years 1999-2009. Although the views expressed in 
such articles cannot be considered an indication of official policy, they can help to clarify the scope of 
debate and highlight common assumptions surrounding a concept such as cultural security. 
The Sixth Plenum, which focused specifically on the issue of cultural system reform, noted that the need 
to protect national cultural security is an important task that is becoming more difficult (CCP Central 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ? ?ƚŚ&ŝǀĞzĞĂƌWůĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ P ‘&ĂĐŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ
global ideological and cultural struggle, it is increasingly urgent to strengthen national cultural 
capabilities and international competitiveness, to resist the cultural infiltration of foreign hostile forces, 
ĂŶĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?WĞŶƚƌĂůŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĂŶĚWZ^ƚĂƚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞ
term has appeared not only in official documents related to culture, however, but also in documents 
ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
was established following the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee in 2013 it included 
 ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ ? ?ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƌĞŵŝƚ ?tŚĞŶWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂŶĚ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇyŝ:ŝŶƉŝŶŐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŚĞ
included cultural security as a distinct category alongside military and social security (Shen and Wu, 
2014).  
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Chinese semi-official and academic sources provide definitions of cultural security that range from 
minimalist to exhaustive. For example, Wu (2014) simply defines cultural security as the health and 
development of national culture in areas such as ideology, values, cultural activities, and cultural 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞĂǀŽŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ ‘ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?wailai yinsu). An article on the WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐEĞƚ
ǁĞďƐŝƚĞƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘,ŽǁƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵůƚƵƌĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂƐǁŚĞŶĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐ
not replaced or assimilated by another, is able to maintain its unique character, independence and 
integrity, and is passed down through the generations at the same time as it continues to develop; 
national ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐǁŚĞŶĂƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵĐƵůƚƵƌĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐƵĨĨĞƌĞƌŽƐŝŽŶŽƌ
destruction due to another culture, is able to maintain the integrity of its own cultural traditions and 
national character, safeguards world culƚƵƌĂůƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
(Zhang and Lao, 2011).  
Academic views on cultural security in China range from relatively liberal and cosmopolitan to more 
conservative and nationalistic, but despite this variation they generally share two core elements in 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶ PǁŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚĂ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ?
The cultural sovereignty element of cultuƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?
ƵƉŚŽůĚŝŶŐŐůŽďĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(wenhua shentou). For example, Zhang and Lao (2011) argue that Chinese culture faces many threats 
and challenges, particularly from the culture of Western developed nations, which use their economic 
power, technological superiority, marketing strategies, and political pressure to conduct cultural 
infiltration into other countries. Jia and Zhao  ? ? ? ? ? )ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝůůĞŐĂůƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶyŝŶũŝĂŶŐ ?
under the influence of external hostile forces such as Islamic extremists, can pose a threat to cultural 
security because they can undermine the identification of ethnic minorities with the national polity, 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŝƌƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞW ?ĂŶĚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵ ?/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚdŝďĞƚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝƚƐ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂůĂŝ>ĂŵĂ ?ŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇŚŝŶĞƐĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐĂƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
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security (e.g. Li, 2010). Jiang ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇƚŽƚŚĞtŽƌůĚdƌĂĚĞKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
corresponding regulations on foreign cultural trade and investment has made it more difficult for China 
to maintain cultural independence and guide public opinion, while making Western cultural infiltration 
into China easier (2010, p. 90). Sun and Wang (2014, p. 107-108) note that certain countries, such as 
Russia, South Africa, Singapore, and Malaysia, view culture as an issue of sovereignty and attempt to 
maintain cultural security by bolsteƌŝŶŐƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ?bentu yishixingtai) or local 
ǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇǀŝĞǁƚŚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨĂ ‘ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚŝŶĂ
ĚƌĞĂŵ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ ? 
The cultural development element of cultural security involves ensuring that Chinese culture remains 
vibrant and becomes more internationally influential, while defending against the threat of cultural 
ƐƚĂŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶƐƵůĂƌŽƌ ‘ĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?scholar Guo Caihua notes that although 
external thƌĞĂƚƐĚŽĞǆŝƐƚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌĞŐƐ ?ŽĨƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ
overlooked when assessing threats to cultural security (Guo, 2013, p. 14). Another academic assessment 
of cultural security identifies weaknesses in Marxism and mainstream ideology as well as problems with 
national cultural development, such as cultural stagnation, lack of cultural innovation, and a lack of 
ability to transmit Chinese cultural products to the world (Han, 2004, pp. 12-13). As part of its section on 
speeding up mechanisms for reform and innovation in the cultural system, the 12th Five Year Plan 
includes a paragraph on developing a system of cultural management, where it refers to the need to 
 ‘ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ƉĞƌĨĐƚƚŚĞŵanagement of the cultural market, 
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚĞůǇƐǁĞĞƉĂǁĂǇĚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƌƵďďŝƐŚƚŚĂƚƉŽŝƐŽŶƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƉŝƌŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĞĂƌŶĞƐƚůǇďƵŝůĚĂ
ŵĂƌŬĞƚŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĂƚŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?WĞŶƚƌĂůŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĂŶĚWZ^ƚĂƚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?
2012).  
When Chinese academics discuss cultural security they often do not clearly distinguish between culture, 
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values, and ideology. :ŝĂŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐĂŶĞǆŵƉůĞŽĨĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚŝƐ
primarily focused on ideology. For Jiang, cultural security exists when: 
a sovereign nation is able to independently select its political system and ideology; resist the attempts of 
other countries to impose their ideologies or ideologically-led modes of politics, economics, or democracy; 
guard against the corrosion, destruction, and subversion by internal or external cultural elements; and is 
therefore able to maintain its own values, form of behavior [xingwei fangshi], and social order, protect 
national self-ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂŶĚĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƵƐĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
culture (Jiang, 2010, p. 89). 
Despite differentiating cultural security from political security, Zhang and Lao (2011) also perceive 
cultural security to be strongly linked with ideological struggle and political values. In addition to 
claiming that Chinese cultural traditions, mainstream values, social sciences, and way of life are under 
attack from the hegemony of Western cultural products, language, academic theory, and holiday 
traditions, they state that in the ideological sphere there are Western hostile forces who are still 
engaged in plots to Westernize or split the country. One relatively early article on cultural security by 
Han Yuan views cultural security in terms of both ideology and national culture (2004, p. 9). Han argues 
that ideology provides the cultural basis for the legitimacy of state power and that national culture is 
also a source of legitimacy and national cohesion, therefore problems in either of these areas could 
spark a national crisis (2004, pp. 9-10).  
 
Soft power and cultural security 
 
In his own work and in collaboration with the Chinese scholar Wang Jisi, Nye claims that American and 
Chinese soft power does not have to be a zero-sum competition and can instead be mutually reinforcing 
(Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22). Nye points out (2011, p. 90) that if 
15 
China and the United States can become more attractive to each other through the mutual growth of 
soft power then this will reduce the potential for conflict between them. If we only focus on national 
security and the security dilemma this argument seems sensible because if each side becomes more 
ŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽ ‘ǁĂŶƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁĂŶƚƐ ?ƚhen this will lead to a growth in shared interests and greater 
cooperation to solve international problems; an increase in the soft power of one does not pose a threat 
to the other in the same way that an increase in military capabilities might. When we consider the way 
that Chinese scholars have applied the concept of soft power to the problem of cultural security, 
however, this mutual attraction scenario becomes more problematic. 
Although Chinese analysts do not generally identify a direct link between the threat of foreign soft 
power and the potential for the CCP to lose its legitimacy, their references to the undermining of 
socialist ideology, values, and national cohesion make it clear that they are concerned that certain 
elements of foreign soft power, particularly the attraction of Western-style democratic systems and 
values, pose a threat to regime security in China. Some scholars argue there is a deliberate soft power 
strategy on the part of the United States to target China. Han (2004, p. 11) refers ƚŽĂ ‘ŵĂũŽƌƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ
ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?ďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƐƉƌĞĂĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ƉŽƐĞƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?,ĂŶŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŽŝƚƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚĐŝƚĞƐEǇĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƐŽĨƚ
power to argue for the importance of culture for contemporary international competition (2004, pp. 
10-11). Jiang (2010, p. 89) argues that American soft power, in the form of American-style democracy 
and values, poses a particularly pressing challenge for China. He claims that Western countries are 
aware of the increasing importance of culture in the international competition over comprehensive 
national power and aim to use soft power to achieve  ‘peaceful evolution ? in China. Jiang reels off a list of 
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƵƐŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
affairs, referring to Chinese patriotism as nationalism, denigrating Chinese collectivist values as closed 
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and backward, and promoting degenerate thought and culture ? such as materialism, hedonism, 
extreme individualism and pornography and violence ?ƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐǇŽƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞƐƚŚŝƐas all being driven 
by a strategic objective P ‘ƚŽĚĞƐƚƌoy our common ideals and spiritual pillars [jingshen zhizhu], to 
ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞŚŝŶĞƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚŽĐŽŶĨƵƐĞŽƵƌƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?:ŝĂŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?,ĂŶ
argues that the United States specifically targets China in a struggle over ideology and values and that 
this has consequences for national cohesion (2004, p. 12).   
Even when American soft power is not seen as a deliberate plot, Chinese analysts can still identify it as a 
source of insecurity for developing countries. Sun and Wang specificĂůůǇƌĞďƵƚEǇĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƐŽĨƚ
power is not threatening to others when they write: 
As far as developing countries in the process of modernization are concerned, despite scholars such as 
Nye (especially American scholars) repeatedly emphasizing in their articles that soft power development 
ŝƐ ‘ŶŽŶ-zero-ƐƵŵ ?ĂŶĚŽĨŐůŽďĂůŵƵƚƵĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
(or American) political system and cultural environment; this will inevitably create a major conflict with 
otheƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůďĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĂǀŽŝĚďĞŝŶŐƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?^ƵŶ
and Wang, 2014, p. 108). 
ŚŝŶĞƐĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐĂůƐŽǁĂƌŶƚŚĂƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-ŚŝŶĂĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂŶĚE'KƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House, threaten cultural 
security in Xinjiang (Zhao, 2012) and that cultural infiltration by foreign religious organizations, such as 
the 'Dalai Lama clique', militant Islamic separatists in Xinjiang, and Christian neoconservatives, also 
poses a security threat (Xi, 2011). From a slightly different perspective on soft power and cultural 
security, Xi (2011, p. 21) claims that foreign religious infiltration could undermine the soft power of 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ. Xi does not specify exactly what he means by soft power, but from the context 
it seems that he is referring to the ability of socialist ideology to attract Chinese domestic audiences. 
Discussions of cultural security in China not only identify foreign soft power as a threat, however, but 
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also refer to soft power as part of the solution to China ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? 
If maintaining cultural security involves not only cultural sovereignty but also cultural development, it is 
clear that in a globalized world it is both impossible and undesirable to prevent cross-cultural interaction 
ďǇ ?ĂƐtƵ ? ? ? ? ? )ƉŚƌĂƐĞƐŝƚ ? ‘ĐůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƐĞĂůŝ ŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?bi guan suo guo). In its section 
on important directions for culture, the 12th Five Year Plan lists  ‘ĞĂƌŶĞƐƚůǇƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞŽƚŚĞƌŐŽĂůƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐŚŝŶĞƐĞ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŽ ‘ŐŽŽƵƚ ?ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
(CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council, 2012). The organization and implementation section of 
the Plan states that it is necessary to correctly manage the relationship between maintaining openness 
to the outside world and safeguarding cultural security; at the same time as upholding national cultural 
security the process of opening up to the outside world and learning from other cultures should 
continue. In late 2013 a Central Committee resolution on deepening reform continued to list the task of 
defending cultural security alongside the need to remain open to positive international cultural 
influences (CCP Central Committee, 2013). 
In this context of globalization, Chinese scholars and analysts have recognized that soft power offers a 
potential path to cultural security that does not involve resorting to international isolation. Along these 
lines, Sun and Wang (2014, p. 109) point out that it will be impossible to achieve the goal of maintaining 
cultural security by relying on tactics of state suppression such as setting up internet firewalls and 
ďůŽĐŬŝŶŐŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞǇĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƌĂŝƐŝŶŐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
 ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?
(Sun and Wang, 2014, p. 110). They argue for a pragmatic, confident, open, and plural perspective on 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚĂƚďƵŝůĚƐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌďǇĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶg cultural traditions, contemporary 
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core social values, and ideological security (Sun and Wang, 2014, p. 112). 
Indeed, for many analysts, responding to cultural security threats involves a strategy that looks 
ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇůŝŬĞĂƉůĂŶƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚpower, albeit one with particular Chinese characteristics. 
For example, Zhang and Lao (2011) argue for the need to maintain cultural security by strengthening 
Chinese culture rather than by limiting cultural interaction between the West and China. In addition to 
exhortations to maintain a cultural development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, build a 
ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚĐŽƌĞǀĂůƵĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĐƵůƚƌĂůƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚĞǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĨŽĐus on the need to increase cultural creativity to make Chinese 
culture more progressive, the need to move from being a country that is rich in cultural resources to one 
that is also strong in terms of cultural production, and the need to come up with creative ways for 
Chinese culture to reach the rest of the world. 
DŽƌĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂůƐŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
influence but tend to place greater weight on strengthening the domestic sources of national cohesion 
and legitimacy. For example, Jiang puts forward three suggestions for how China can make use of its soft 
ƉŽǁĞƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?ƌĞƐŝƐƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ƚŚĞ
most important task is to build a socialist core value system, which will help unify different groups 
within society by increasing the attractiveness and cohesive power of socialist ideology; second, 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
culture (which Jiang equates with socialism); third, implement a cultural security strategy based on 
developing the country, because for Jiang the soft power of culture ultimately relies on the support of 
political, economic, and military hard power (Jiang, 2010, pp. 90-91). Jia Youjun argues that the key to 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶyŝŶũŝĂŶŐŝƐƚŽ ‘ǀŝŐŽƌŽƵƐůǇƚƌĂŝŶĂŶĚĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŚŝŶĞƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƉŝƌŝƚĂŶĚ ŵŽĚĞƌŶƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? ?
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ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽƌŵĂĐŽƌĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?:ŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?,ĂŶ ?Ɛ
recommendations for dealing with cultural security challenges include both strengthening culture and 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇĂƚŚŽŵĞĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŶfluence (2004, pp. 13- ? ? ) ?ǁŚŝůĞtƵ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇďƵƚĂůƐŽ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƉĞƌŝŵĞƚĞƌ ? ?sixiang fangxian) by using propaganda campaigns to 
develop the socialist core value system and raise cultural consciousness. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is important, as Rawnsley (2012, p. 125) points out, to  ‘ “ĚĞ-tĞƐƚĞƌŶŝƐĞ ?ŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƐŽĨƚ
ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ‘resources ? of states such as China and 
Russia, however, or pointing out the ways in which they do not conform to liberal norms ? it also 
requires examining the insecurities that lie behind their soft power strategies. Chinese analysts working 
in this area not only view foƌĞŝŐŶƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĂƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇďƵƚĂůƐŽƐĞĞƚŚĞ
growth of Chinese soft power as a means by which to enhance aspects of regime security in response to 
the challenges of globalization. Through the lens of regime security, developing soft power in the 
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŚŝŶĞƐĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĨĞĂƌŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
rise to great power status but also part of a nation building or state making project.  
The distinctive Chinese focus on the domestic aspects of soft power, which has been noted by a number 
of scholars, is about more than just addressing a weakness in China ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?it is also 
about addressing important regime security challenges. TŚĞW ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝƐƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚďǇƚŚe 
ideological challenge of the West as well as by the attractiveness of alternative sources of authority 
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƌŽƵŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉŽůŝƚǇŝŶĂ
20 
world dominated by liberal democratic norms is often presented as a factor that places limitations on 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƵƚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐŝƐĂŶ
incentive to develop soft power. The Chinese focus on domestic factors is not simply an indicator of 
ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛlack of soft power but also reveals a qualitative difference between the kinds of insecurities that 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂWestern liberal democracy.  
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